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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF urAH 
DALE H. DDlILLE, Administrator ) 
of the Estate of Terry Lee De.Mille 
and Constance Hope DeMille, also ) 
known as Connie DeMille, deceased, 
) 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
v. 
) 
PHYLLIS ERICKSON, Administratrix 
of the Estate of Frederick Kenneth ) 
Spendlove, deceased, 
) 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
11385 
RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING AND 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Plaintiff and Respondent Dale w. DeMille 
respectfully petitions the Court to grant· a 
rehearing of the captioned matter upon the 
following grounds and reasons: 
POINT I 
The physical evidence, viewed in a light 
favorable to Plaintiff, compels the conclusion 
that the Spendlove vehicle was well across the 
center line at the moment of impact and that the 
- 2 -
Jrivcr thereof w<is negligent in causing the death 
of Constance Hope DeMille. 
POINT II 
The Court re-examined and determined the 
facts contrary to the decision of the jury and in 
a light most favorable to the Defendant in 
arriving at its decision in violation of the 
jurisdictional limits placed upon its powers of 
appellate review by the Constitution and Statutes 
of the State of Utah. 
POINT III 
The Court's decision denies Plaintiff equal 
protection of the laws in violation of Article I, 
Section 24, of the Constitution of the State of 
Utah and the 14th Amendment to the Constitution 
of the United States. 
DATED this 9th day of January, 1970. 
Arthur H. Nielsen 
NIELSEN, CONDER, HANSEN 
AND HENRIOD 
and 
- 3 -
J. Harlan Burns 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Respondent 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING 
POINT I 
THE PHYSICAL EVIDENCE, VIEWED IN A LIGHT 
?!1VORABLE TO PLAINTIFF, COMPELS THE CONCLUSION 
TUAT Tilli SPENDLOVE VEHICLE WAS WELL ACROSS THE 
CZ'.:lTER LINE AT THE MOMENT OF IMPACT AND THAT THE 
DRIVER TiillREOF WAS NEGLIGENT IN CAUSING THE DEATH 
OF CONSTANCE HOPE DEMILLE. 
The starting point in the law of evidence 
applying to a no eye-witness head-on collision in 
Ulah is Hood v. Strevell-Patterson Hardware Co., 
6 Utah 2d 340, 313 P.2d 800 (1957). In that 
cecision th~ Court expressly held that conditions 
existing on t,he highway in a no eye-witness head-
on collision may give rise to certain inferences 
of fact respecting the position of the respective 
automobiles at . the time of impact from which 
- 4 -
11c:.,l:i.(;ence from being on the wrong side of the 
hi;;lmay can be presumed. This is so regardless 
of the fact no one exists who can explain why the 
driver i;;as on the wrong side of the road. The 
.'ood case makes exceedingly clear that there is 
no presumption of due care in a case where the 
physical facts show negligence from being on the 
wrong side of the road. The Wood decision places 
Utah in line with a number of decisions from 
other jurisdictions to the effect that the 
physical facts and circumstances of a collision 
may be sufficiently clear to warrant the trial 
court in submitting the questions of how the 
collision occurred and who was at fault to a jury 
for decision even in the total absence of eye-
witness .testimony. Wilson v. Barnes, 224 S.W.2d 
892 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1949); Baumler v. 
Hazelwood, 347 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. 1961); and 
~elin v. Consumers Coop Ass'n, 241 P.2d 693 
(Kan. 1952). 
- s -
In the instant case even counsel for the 
De:~e:ndant must concede that if the Spendlove 
rehicle uas partly across the center line, its 
driver, Frederick Kenneth Spendlove, was 
i1e~li;;cni: as a matter of law ii;i contributing to 
~he collision. This is so because Defendant's 
counsel took precisely this position with respect 
to the DcHille automobile which all concede was 
partly across the center line at the time of 
im?act. The Trial Court agreed with Defendant 1 s 
counsel and dismissed the suit as to Terry Lee 
DeMille on the ground he was contributorily 
.-ic:.;li;;ent as a matter of law because the physical 
Zacts showed. he was partly across the center line 
Qt the time of impact. Both counsel for the 
DC'fondai-it. and the Trial Court drew from the place 
uf impact and from the other undisputed facts of 
Lhe accident an inference of negligence as to the 
J~ILlle vehicle so strong both were willing to 
draw it as a matter of law--as. a matter upon 
- 6 -
,,,,;~c;1 rcaGonable minds could not disa3ree. 
The sole and only di~ference in the physical 
~.Jets as to the two vehicles was the number of 
i:eet and inches each was across the center line 
when they collided; that is, neither attempted to 
stop or take any evasive action prior to the 
collision but proceeded to the point of impact 
without skidding, without swerving and without 
any particular reduction of speed. The 
tremendous head-on impact, the fact no skid marks 
were left up to the point of impact and the fact 
neither vehicle rolled over leave room for no 
other inference but that both proceeded to the 
point of im~act in the same or nearly the same 
manner. The question left for the jury as to the 
Spendlove vehicle was whether it was over the 
center line at the time of ·the collision. 
Viewing the evidence in a light favorable to 
Plaintiff as the Court must as this is a law-jury 
case, it undisputably appears. that the Spendlove 
- 7 -
whicle was wel~ across the center line at the 
Lime of impact so that Defendant 1 s decedent was 
negligent as a matter of law. 
1. The sharp gouge mark numbered Point 6 on 
ilxhibit 5 was nearest the center white line--
actually at the edge of the white line (Tr. 51, 
54). 
2. This gouge was made by a sharp.portion of 
the undercarriage or frame of the Vo~kswagen--a. 
part between the wheels. It was made when the 
fra~e and_ undercarriage were smashed to the 
ground and the wheels were collapsed in the 
collision (Tr. 169, ·171, 174). · 
3. A rubber scuff mark about 20 inches _wide 
with a scrape in the center was 49 inches east 
from the center of ,the white center line_(Tr. 32). 
The easternmost edge of this mark was barely the 
Width of the Volkswagen (60 inches) away from the 
center line. 
4. The entire front end of the Volkswagen 
- 8 -
::c.s sm~shc<l to the ground in the impact and ~ 
front uhccls of the Volkswagen uere collapsed to 
ti1e east or ri9ht; that is, to the east or right 
of a driver seated in the Volkswagen and the 
right wheel of the Volkswagen was thrust ~head of 
Lhe left front wheel (Plaintiff 1 s Exhibit 11). 
Exhibit 11 shows that the primary damage to the 
Volkswagen occurred to the front and to the west 
or left side; that is, the driver's side, and 
that the front portion of the Volkswagen was all 
smashed down to the east--to its driver's right. 
5. A rubber skid mark made by the Volkswagep 
commenced in the west lane (the Chevrolet's lane) 
105 inches to the rear or south of the foregoing 
mentioned marks and ran east through the east 
lane towards the point at which the Volkswagen 
finally came to rest (Plaintiff's Exhibits 5 and 
u, Tr. 35, 36). 
6. It is clear from the evidence that the 
i!olkswagen was traveling north at the time of the 
- 9 -
~ccident; the Chevrolet south. 
7. The photographs in evidence show both 
~u~ooobiles came to rest east of the center line. 
The Volkswagen was off the traveled portion and 
the Chevrolet was about in the center of the east 
lane. The Volkswagen changed direction after 
impnct and was knocked back towards the south 
from whence it had come. The Chevrolet, after 
smnshing the Volkswagen to the ground, continued 
south, apparently being lifted into the air and 
thrust sideways by the impact. It traveled in 
this manner some distance before coming down on 
the highway, skiddfog southward down the highway 
sideways some distance, finally orienting itself 
to point nearly south again as it came to rest. 
8. The scrapes and marks on the highway made 
by the Volkswagen were made when its front end 
was smashed down to the right and east in the 
collision. 
The sole, solitary reasonable deduction to be 
- 10 -
drmm from the foregoing as to the position 
of the Volkswagen as to the center line at the 
yoint of initial impact is that the Volkswagen 
was some>vhat to the left or west of the scrape 
marks at the moment of impact and that it left 
the marks when smashed eastward to its driver's 
fight. This would necessarily have to be so 
(.liven the eastern direction towards which the 
front end of the Volkswagen was collapsed, the 
north direction in which it was traveling prior 
to the collision and its position off the east 
lane after the collision. 
The necessary result is that the Volkswagen 
was well over the center line at the time of 
initial impact. 
It is forth.er manifestly reasonable and 
cousistent to infer that the skid mark made by 
the Volkswagen (Point 2 on Exhibits 5 and 6) 
commencing in the west lane was made not after 
any rotation of the Volkswagen but by its rear 
- 11 -
wheel or wheels as it was knocked dovmwards, 
backwards and towards the east off the highway by 
the Chevrolet. The fact that the occupants were 
not thrown out of the left side of the Volkswagen 
until it was off the highway and the direction 
the Volkswagen faced at its resting point are 
much more consistent with this conclusion than 
any violent rotation of the Vo~kswagen 
immediately on impact. So also is the fact the 
skid mark was 105 inches from the scuff mark--
exactly where the former would be expected if 
made by the right rear wheel a~ the Volkswagen 
was knocked backwards and sideways in the 
collision. Being smashed down on the highway in 
the collision, how the Volkswagen could leap in 
the air after t'he Chevrolet passed over it and 
~void any dragging of its rear tires or anything 
else while a turn of nearly 180 degrees was 
executed asks for an extreme strain of· reason. 
'!he striations in the rubber scuff mark marked as 
- 12 -
~oint 1 on E;,hibits 5 and 6 are consistent with a 
ra~idly sp-inning tire being suddenly slammed 
, sideways on the road and certainly do not call 
for a conclusion the Volkswagen was violently 
rotated counterclockwise. 
Even if the Volkswagen could have first 
rotated and then left the skid mark in the 
Chevrolet's lane, still there is no conceivable 
11ay the Volkswagen could have left the sharp 
~ouge mark at the very edge of the center line 
arrd the scuff mark only 49 inches away from the 
' center line upon the collapsation of its front 
\!heels and front end to the east unless it was 
across the center line at the moment of initial 
impact. Only if the Volkswagen's front wheels 
l 
had been collapsed to its own driver's left or 
Lo11ards the west, then, and only then, would the 
location of the marks have been inconclusive as 
respects the position of the Volkswagen as to the 
c~nter line at the moment of impact and just 
i 
I' 
II 
. - 13 -
~Jrior to the collision. There is absolutely no 
uay consistent with the physical evidence that 
the Volkswagen could have been pushed west 
to11ards the center of the highway on impact as 
stated in the concurring opinion. The impact was 
into the driver's side of the Volkswagen. This 
pushed the Volkswagen wheels to the right. The 
· Volkswa3en ended up on the east side of the 
I highway. These facts compel precisely the 
I 
! opposite conclusion to that stated in the 
I concurring opinion, i.e. that the Volkswagen was 
pushed away and not towards the center of the 
highuay. Measuring from the west edge of the 
,scuff mark, and it is necessary to measure from 
the western edge because the wheel was collapsed 
towards the east, places the Volkswagen about a 
foot and a half over the center line at the time 
of impact. The counterclockwise rotation of the 
Volkswagen after impact postulated by Officer I Borch was doubtless rejected by the jury who 
- 14 -
probably inferred from the evidence that the 
striations in the scuff mark were, in fact, made· 
'oy the fonrard spinning motion of the wheel as it 
collapsed and that being struck mainly on the 
driver's half the Volkswagen was, in fact, driven.· 
backwards and in a southeasterly direction, 
rotating in a clockwise fashion about 120 degrees 
as it traveled backwards until it came to rest 
off the shoulder of the highway, throwing the 
occupants out o.n its left hand or driver's side 
as it stopped. The position of the bodies of the 
1 
occupants are consistent with this hypothesis. 
So are the scrape marks on the road. So is the 
0kid mark commencing one foot seven inches into 
the west lane made by the rear wheels of the 
Volkswagen after the impact, the force of which 
changed its direction. From all the evidence, 
the jury l1ere compelled to believe the Volkswagen 
11as traveling at least one foot seven inches over 
1 the center line at the time of impact and that 
- 15 -
ueon impact its front end and undercarriage were 
colL1pse<l to the right within the two feet 
maximum movement limit postulated by Officer 
Burch to the place where the front end left. the 
gou:;e marks found, one of which was at the edge 
of the center line and that the rear wheels of 
the Volkswagen, not being collapsed, left the 
skid mark found at Point 2 on Plaintiff's Exhibit 
' .Jo 
The conclusion that the Volkswagen was across 
the line is compelled by all of the tangible, 
physical, undisputed evidence which was placed 
before the jury. The jury did so conclude and 
from that fact naturally drew the same inference 
of negligence as to the Volkswagen driver as 
counsel for the Defendant asked the Court to draw 
and which the Court did draw as to the Chevrolet 
driver as a matter of law. 
Under Hood v. Strevell-Patterson Hardware Co., 
6 Utah 2d 340, 313 P .2d 800 (1957), Plaintiff 
- 16 -
~~irly obtained the verdict rendered and the 
juci0mcnt entered upon it should be sustained. 
It is respectfully but earnestly submitted 
that the Court improperly evaluated and weighed 
;he evidence and even resolved every inference 
therefrom in a light most favorable to Defendant ' 
and that it even had to ignore substantial 
portions of the undisputed physical evidence to 
reach the conclusions that it did. 
POINT II 
'lliE COURT RE-EXAMINED AND DETERMINED THE FACTS 
CO:-ITRARY TO THE DECISION OF THE JURY AND IN A 
LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO THE DEFENDANT IN ARRIVING 
, AT ITS DECISION 1N VIOLATION OF THE 
Jlffi.ISDICTIONAL LJMITS PLACED UPON ITS POWERS OF 
Ai'PELLATE REVIEW BY THE CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH. 
The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court of the State of Utah is limited by Article 
VIII, Section 9, of the Utah Constitution which 
- 17 -
provicle.s in material part as follows: ". • • In 
equity cases the appeal. may be on questions of 
both lau and fact; in cases at law the apJ,Jeal 
shall be on questions of law alone ••• ". 
The legislature has provided the same rule by. 
statute. Section 78-2•2, Utah Code Annotated, 
· 1953, provides: 11 • • • In equity cases the appeal 
may be on questions of both law and fact; in 
cases at law the appeal shall be on questions of 
law alone. • II . . 
Under these constitutional and statutory 
provisions, the Supreme Court is absolutely 
powerless to substitute its evaluation of t~e 
evidence for that of the trial court or trial 
jury. Pixton v. Dunn, 120 Utah 658, 238 P.2d 408 
(1951); Barker v. Dunham, 9 Utah 2d 244, 342 P.2d 
1 867 (1959). It is elementary that the 
1 jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, with the 
exception of the extraordinary.writs, is 
appellate only. The Supreme Court does not sit 
- 18 -
1s a trial court in any way, shape or form in the 
ordinary law or equity action. State v. Kinder, 
M Utah 2d 199, 381 P.2d 82 (1963). The 
juri::;diction of the Court of course is a 
fundamental matter always recognized by the Court 
even on its own motion. It cannot proceed beyond 
its jurisdiction even though the parti~s be 
i uilling. \/old berg v. Industrial Commission, 74 
U~ah 309, 279 Pac. 609 (1929) and Logan City v. 
~lotter, 75 Utah 272, 284 Pac. 333 (1930). 
\Jithout referring to the constitutional and 
statutory basis of its appellate jurisdiction, 
the Court has time and time again held that .it 
cannot and will not weigh conflicting evidence in 
a law case whether tried to the court or ju ... ·y an~· 
1~ill in no event re-determine questions of fact 
in a jury case. Lyman v. To~m of Price, 63 Utah 
90, 222 Pac. 599 (1924). Sine v. Salt Lake 
~sp. Co., 106 Utah 289, 147 P.2d 875 (1944) 
and Reynolds v. w. W. Clyde & Co., 5 Utah 2d 151 
- 19 -
2~3 P.2d )30 (1956) and Stickle v. Union Pacific 
~' 122 Utah 477, 251 P.2d 867 (1962). The 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah succinctly 
stated the jurisprudential reasons why this is so 
in Stickle: 
ncourts, as final arbiters of law, could 
arro~ate to themselves arbitrary and 
dan::;crous powers by presuming to determine 
questions of fact which litigants have a 
ri::;ht to have passed upon by juries. Part of 
the raerit of the jury system is its 
safe::;uarding against such arbitrary power in 
the courts. To the great credit of the 
courts of this country, they have been 
extremely reluctant to infringe upon this 
right, and by leaving it unimpaired have kept 
the administration of justice close to the 
people." 251 P .2d at 871. 
111 Under section 9, art. 8, Const. (Utah), 
the Supreme Court, in cases at law tried 
before a court without a jury, will examine 
the evidence only so far as may be necessary 
to determine questions of law, and will not 
pass upon the sufficiency of the evidence to 
justify a finding or judgment, unless there 
is no legitimate proof to support it. In no 
case at law, whether tried with or without a 
jury, can the appellate court determine 
questions of fact. 1 
"This rule has been reiterated and applied 
in subsequent cases too numerous to mention." 
Lyman v. Town of Price, 222 Pac •. at 600. 
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In the Reynold~ case cited above, the Court 
held: 
"Only those verdicts that appear to be 
unsupported by any credible evidence that 
Hould justify them in the minds of reasonable 
men, do we disturb. That is the jury system. 
. . . 
11
• • • it· hardly bears repeating that in a 
case like this the factual situation will be 
reviewed on appeal in a light most favorable 
to the party prevailing below. 
. . . 
" .in cases where there is substantial 
evidence which, if believed, will support the. 
jury's verdict, the trial court may exercise 
its discretion in sustaining the verdict, and 
ue, having no discretion in such event, must 
sustain both. 11 
Cottrell v. Grand Union Tea Co., 5 Utah 2d 
187, 299 P.2d 622 (1956), stressed the 
jurisdictional rule concerning jury found facts 
as follo\·1s: 
"This case having been tried to a jury, 
they were the exclusive judges of the 
evidence and of the inferences to be drawn 
therefrom. It was not the privilege of the 
court to disagree with and overrule their 
action unless the evidence so unerringly 
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:'ointccl to a contrary conclusion that there 
e::i:::tcd no reasonable basis for the jury's 
iincl:i.n:;. This court has many times affirmed 
con:r,1::.tmcnt to a policy of reluctance to 
intc;_·fcre uith findings of fact and verdicts 
renc:c;.·cd by juries, and has declared that is 
(sic) should be done only when the matter is 
so clear as to be free from doubt. In Butz v. 
U;1ion Pac. R.R. we quoted with approval the 
lan~:;;_,age of Justice Murphy, speaking for the 
u,1i tccl States Supreme Court with respect to 
trial by jury: '"· • .A right so fundamental 
and ::;acred to the citizen, whether guaranteed 
by the Constitution or provided by statute, 
should be :jealousy guarded by the courts.' " 
,\ga::.n, in Si::icl•le v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., we 
stated '' ••• ue remain cognizant of the vital 
importance of the privilege of trial by jury 
in our system of justice and deem it our duty 
to zealously protect and preserve it.'" 299 
P.2d at 626. 
The principle that a finding of fact by a 
jm.7 is conclusive and will not be overturned if 
supported by evidence and that the Court will 
never evaluate and weigh the evidence in a law 
case, particularly a jury case~ has been followed 
in other cases too numerous to mention. See, for 
e:;ample, Henrie v. Rocky Mountain Packing Corp., 
il3 Utah l,L;l,, 202 P.2d 727 (1949); Seybold v. 
~on Pac. R. Co., 121 Utah 61, 239. P.2d 174 
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(i0'.;l); and Taylor v. Weber County, 4 Utah 2d 328 
293 r.2<l 925 (1956). 
In the Seybold case the Court expressly 
a?provccl Ui:;more 1 s rule as to the quantum of 
evidence needed to support a jury finding which 
is: "Are there facts in evidence which if 
u:i.'.l::i.swered would justify men of ordinary reason 
arr<l fairness in affinning the question which the 
plaintiff is bound to maintain." 239 P .2d at 177. 
T;1e question which the Plaintiff was bound to 
maintain in the instant case was basically 
whether or not negligence of the driver of the 
Spendlove vehicle caused the accident. He was 
negligent if on the wrong side of the highway at 
the tirae of the accident. The facts in evidence 
justified the jury in finding and the trial court 
ln affinning that the Volkswagen was on the wrong 
side so negligence existed. As pointed out under 
f'olnt I above, not oniy do the physical facts in 
evidence permit an inference the Volkswagen was 
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on the urong side of the road, they compel 
e;;actly tl1at conclusion. Facts not so compelling 
uould have been sufficient to take the case to 
the jur)' because the party favored by the verdict 
is entitled to have the Supreme Court consider 
all the evidence, and every inference and 
intcnclment fairly arising therefrom in a light 
most favorable to him. Taylor v. Weber County, 
~· 
The Court plainly evaluated and weighed the 
evidence and interpreted it in a light most 
favorable to Defendant and not to Plaintiff in 
arriving at its decision. Plaintiff is cognizant 
of the principle that a party is not entitled to 
uniform judicial decisions. However, should the 
Court's opinion be construed as only overturning 
the judicial rule that the evidence is viewed in 
a light favorable to the prevailing party, that 
, 11ould not solve the matter. The Court still went 
beyond the jurisdictional limits placed by the 
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co,1::;titution and Statutes upon its powers of 
~~cllatc review. 
nccausc the Court ~ecided questions of fact 
contrary not only to the jury's decision but to 
co,1clusions compelled by undisputed physical· 
evidence, Plaintiff is entitled to a rehearing. 
Upon rehearing, the Court should apply the rules 
of appellate review to the case in a manner 
consiste..-it with Article VIII, Section 9, ol the 
Utah Constitution and Section 78-2-2, Utah Code 
Annotated (1953). 
POINT III 
THE COlmT 1 S DECISION DENIES PLAINTIFF EQUAL 
l'I',OT:- ~:TIOrl OF THE LAH IN VIOIATION OF ARTICLE I, 
SECTION 2L}, OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF 
llfMI AND THE 14TII AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION 
OF TUE IBUTED STATES. 
Article 1, Section 24, of the Constitution of 
1 ;1e State of Utah provides: "All laws of a 
1 uener.:il nature· shall have uniform operation." 
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Section 1 of the 14th Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States provides in 
oaterial part: 
". • .No state shall make or enforce any 
law which shall abridGe the privile::;es or 
inununities of citizens of the United States; 
nor shall any state deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws." 
Plaintiff was denied the right to have a jury 
detennination of the issues in a law case, which 
bears no distinguishable difference from the 
great nu~ber of other law cases in which jury 
verdicts have been given a degree of sanctity in 
Utah, in violation of the above constitutional 
provisions. 
In a civil jury case the parties have a 
i constitutional right to have the jury determine 
the facts: "In civil cases three-fourths of the 
jurors may find a verdict." Consti. Utah, Art. I, 
Sec, 10. 
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Since the jury has the constitutional right 
to find a verdict in a ju~y case, neither the 
ti·ial cou:Lt nor the Supreme Court have the right 
to tal~e it away. This most basic and fundamental 
jurisprudential doctrine is also of constitutional 
status in the federal system. The 7th Amendment 
to t[1e Constitution of the United States provides: 
"In Suits at conunon law, where the value in 
i 
controversy shall exceed t't.Jenty dollars, the 
I i'i~ht of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no 
' fact tried. by a jury, shall be otherwise re-
! examined in any Court of the United States, than 
i 
accord in·'"' to the :cuies of the common law." 
(Gmphasis added) 
llhile it is true that the 7th Amendment has 
· cot yet been held applicable to the states by 
• virtue of the due-process clause of the 14th 
""11e11dment, it is also true that the United States 
I Supreme Court has recently held that the 
: ~uarantee of trial by jury in criminal cases 
! 
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:irnvickd by the 6th i\mendment is a fundamental 
c'.uc-proccss right required of the states under 
~he lLrth Amendment. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 
~5, 20 L. ed.2d 491, 88 Sup. Ct. 1444 (1968). 
The United States Supreme Court there simply held: 
'
1Decause we believe that trial by jury in 
c~im:Qal cases is fundamental to the American 
schE:me of justice, we hold that the 
Fou~teenth lunendment guarantees a right of 
jury trial in all criminal cases which--were 
they to be tried in a federal court--would 
come within the Sixth Amendment's guarantee." 
391 U.S. at ll~9, 20 L. ed.2d at 496. 
In view of the Duncan case and other recent 
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United 
States which have included more and more of the 
Bill of Rights in the guarantees provided 
citizens of each state through the 14th Amendment, 
it seems probable that the 7th Amendment 1 s 
~Ll~rantee of trial by jury in civil cases will 
soon be held mandatory upon the states. 
Certainly there is no rational basis founded in 
principle upon which trial by jury can be said to 
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.,c of fundnn1erltal importance in a criminal case, 
but ,1ot in a civil case. Certainly both type of 
~rocccdin0s materially affect lives and property. 
fa Duncan the defendant suffered a sixty-day 
i [erm in prison (during which he would, of course, 
:i, cared for at the expense of the State) and the 
loss of only $150.00, the amount of his fine. In 
this case the small children represented by 
Plaintiff who have already lost their parents who 
leit practically no estate in excess of burial 
cosl:s and the like for them are apparently to 
lose a $23,000.00 jury verdict, the forfeiture of 
which will sentence them to the charity of 
relatives or friends for years and affect their 
lives far more materially and permanently than 
the life of the defendant in Duncan would have 
lieen affected by the relatively light 
disabilities imposed on him. Where· is the 
1 distinction in equity, justice, morals or logic? 
Not only does jury determination of fact 
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r;icii:~crs :~a a jury case have a constitutional 
{ound.J.tion, it is a right provided by two Utah 
sta~utcs. Section 78-21-1, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, provides in material part: "In actions •• 
. for injuries, an issue of fact may be tried by a 
jury. • • 11 Section 78-21-2 a clearer directive. 
It specifically directs: "All questions of fact, 
\1l1~rc the trial is by jury. • • are to be decided 
Ly the jury ••• " (Emphasis added) 
The protection of these statutes and the 
2rotection of the decisional · 1aw which has 
developed to the same effect was denied Plaintiff 
by the decision of the Court in the instant case 
lor the simple reason that there was more than 
ilillple basis for the jury's decision founded in 
the uncontrovertable physical evidence, and yet 
the Court found the facts to be othewise than the 
jury ~1ad found, not applying to Plaintiff's case 
t:1e principle stated in the statutes cited above 
and the great abundance of decisional law which 
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l1c.s been developed to the same effect. 
i)laintiff has thus be~n denied equal 
?rotection of the law that the jury decides the 
fact::;; that verdicts of juries have ~ degree of 
~rity and that they will not be upset unless 
' they find no support in the evidence. 
'rTl:e purpose of a trial is to afford the 
partie::; a full and fair opportunity to 
present their evidence and contentions and to 
have the issues in dispute beti;·1een them 
determined by a jury. Uhen this objective 
has been accomplished, and the trial court 
has ;3iven its approval thereto by refusing to 
:;rant a new trial, the judgment should be 
looked upon \vi th some degree of verity. The 
presumption is in favor of its validity and 
the burden is upon the appellant to show some 
persuasive reason for upsetting it. Under 
the cardinal and oft-repeated rule of review, 
uc will not disturb the jury's finding so 
lon~ a3 it is supported by substantial 
evidence, that is, evidence which, together 
uith the fair inferences that may be dra\'m 
therefrom, reasonable minds could conclude as 
the jury did; and we will not reverse a 
jud0ffient entered thereon unless in arriving 
at it substantial and prejudicial error was 
comr:iitted in the sense that in its absence 
the:;:-e is a reasonable likelihood that there 
uould have been a different result." Gordon 
v. Provo City, 15 Utah 2d 287, 290, 391 P.2d 
430, 433 (1964). 
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;i;c: ,;:_JUrt hc..s heretofore always observed the 
1 rLnciplc stated in Justice Crockett's dissenting 
01ii,1ion--ihat it is not a matter of whether the 
~u;-icc;ilc Court agrees or disagrees with the jury 
1erdict \;hich is the controlling factor. In Page 
v. Utah Home Fire Ins. Co., 18 Utah 2d 210, 418 
P.2cl 231 (1966), an insurance agent bought two 
policies of fire insurance on a building costing 
only $1,600.00. He moved the building to a sit_e 
11ilere the State would take it by condeI1U1ation for 
a freeuay and it burned down. The agent sued on 
the policies and recovered a total of $30,000.00~ 
Justice Henriod stated he would have certainly 
denied any recovery whatsoever; but since the· .,, · 
jury had believed otherwise on controverted 
~vidence, its verdict would have to be sustained 
"on L~ ,:liar principJ,es of appellate review." 
Plaintiff has been denied application of the 
:'.ctle of Gibbs v. Blue Cab, Inc., 122 Utah 312, 
249 P.2d 213 (1952). This case involved a 
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collision between a cab and a bicycle on a dark, 
r;1iny night. An appeal was taken from a directed 
verdict for the defendant which was rendered on 
the basis that contributory negligence existed as 
a raJ.tter of law. The Supreme ~ourt reversed and 
directed that the cause be submitted to the jury. 
i:~le are committed to the principle that 
matters of negligence, contributory 
neglir;ence and proximate cause gene:cally are 
jury questions, unless the evidentiary facts 
are of such conclusive character as to 
require all reasonable minds to conclude that 
the ultimate fact of negligence, contributory 
negligence or proximate cause does or does 
not exist. 11 249 P.2d at 215. 
Had this principle been applied to the instant 
cn~e, the resuit certainly would have been 
different because the uncontroverted evidentiary 
facts do not only amply and sufficiently support 
the conclusion the Volkswagen was on the wrong 
side of the road at the time 'the collision 
occurred, they absolutely compel such conclusion. 
The decision of the Court amounts to a 
holdin8 that not only the jury but the trial 
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,_-,iu;_-;; .:ind the dissenting judge are all manifestly 
1 u,1;e:asonable in their evaluation and consideration 
o~ the evidence. Yet it has often been held by 
t;:e court that where the facts and circumstances 
ace such that there is doubt as to whether· 
reasonable men might arrive at different 
conclusions, then this very doubt means the 
~c;estion is one for the jury and not one of law 
for the court. Lemmon v. Denver & Rio Grande 
':ectern R.R. Co., 9 Utah 2d 195, 341 P .2d 215 
(1959). Plaintiff has been denied equal 
protection of the rule always heretofore applied 
~Y the court that unless a reasonable man could 
not come i:o the conclusion in question even when 
all of the evidence and the.inferences fairly 
tlerived therefrom are taken in a light most 
iavorable thereto, a jury verdict will not be set 
a3i<le. Porter v. Price, 11 Utah 2d 80, 355 P.2d 
60 (1960). Newton v. Oregon Shortline R.R. Co., 
";J Utah 219, 134 Pac. 56} (1913) and Stickle v. 
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0 ,_c.;,1 Pc.cific R. Co., 122 Utah 477, 251 P .2d 867 
( 1952) 
I'l.:iintiff earnestly submits·that Plaintiff 
1;as danied equal protection of the law that 
~uest ions of fact in a law case are for the jury; 
that physical· circumstantial evidence alone on a 
road in a no eye.-witness case showing a vehicle 
to have been on the wrong side of the road at the 
mor.1ent the accident happened is sufficient 
evidence. of negligence to take the case to the 
jury; that the Court will not overturn a jury · 
verdict unless there is no evidence to support.it 
and that the evidence will be viewed on appeal in 
a light favorable to the prevailing party. 
:'L\intiff submits that there is no basis whatever 
i rnr :;:oefusing to apply these elementary rules to 
t11e instant case and no basis upon ·which the 
i:ist:illt case can be distinguished from the 
Liultitude of other negligence cases in which such 
:ulcs are applied. 
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Under Article 1, Section 24, of the 
Co1<:.;L.i.~ut::.on of the State of Utnh nnd under the 
u,i.:[1 :\1.1cc1dr.ien.t, Pla.intiff is entitled to the same 
rules o.2 evidence and procedure for the security 
of his ri.::;l1ts and cause of action as anyone else 
<.md pa:cticularly to fair, non-discriminatcry 
.i~iplico.tion. of Utah laws relating to juries. 
'J',:u.'.'.:: v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 66 L. ed. 254, 
42 Su;>. Ct. 124 (192l);Connolly v. Union Sewer 
- ~ip8 Co., 184 U.S. 540, 46 L. ed. 679, 22 Sup. Ct. 
431 (1901); Black v. Caldwell, 83 Fed. 880 (D. 
iwnt. 1897); Board of Education v. Alliance Assur~ 
0_:_, 159 Fed. 99.:'., (N. D. Cal. 1908); Alton V. 
P~~llins Co. v. State, 396 P.2d 537 (Wash. 1964); 
:'.:.:~25"':I v. Superior Court, 257 P.2d 661 (Cal. 1953); 
:_ioi-~~J.llti v. Horgan.ti, 222 P .2d 78 (Cal. 1950); In 
l(C: 'l'~urnr:i2r, 36 Cal. Rptr. 281, 388 P.2d 177 (Sup. 
Ci:. Cal. 1964); DEGNAN, Ri3ht to Civil Jury Trial 
1:-i U'cah; Constitution and Statute, 8 Utah L. Rev. 
S7, 99 (1962) and 16 AM. JUR.2d, Constitutional 
.~,, ·~cc. 533. ~  .... 
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I,1 T;~ua:~ v. Corriean, supra, an Arizona law 
;irohioiting a court from affording an employer 
tile equitable relief of an injunction in a labor 
dis~mte uas held to violate the equal protection 
cl2.use o:Z the Constitution. The Court held that 
it uas beside the point to say that the 
?laintiffs in that case had no vested right to a 
certain type of equitable relief so that taking 
it away did not deprive them of due process of 
LZL11. The Court held that the 14th Amendment 
irrtended that equal protection and security 
should be given to all under lil~e circumstances 
and that this i~cluded like access to the courts 
ot the country under like tenns for the 
2rotcction of person and property. Black v. 
b_lducll, supra, involved a statute of the State 
o~ llontana susceptible ·to an interpretation 
forbiddin3 a foreign corporation from purchasing 
)toperty at a judicial foreclosure sale. The 
- 37 -
court held any such interpretation would violate 
L.,1c cc;,ual protection clause of the 14th l.mendment. 
~~2 caGe of Board of Ed~cation of Alliance Assur. 
Co., supra, was. concerned with a statute in the 
State of California which required insurance 
companies in defending suits on policies to plead 
cc:.::tain matters in their answers specifically and 
ii1 a certain manner. The Court held no valid 
Lasis c:~isted for requiring this of insurance 
cor,1panies in the limited cases covered by the 
statute so that the statute denied equal 
proL:ection of the law. Alton V. Phillips Co. v. · 
~, sunra, involved a contractor which brought 
suit against the state for claims arising under a 
public contract. His suit was dismissed and the 
1 lc~islature then passed a special act allowing a 
suit at the instance of the contractor and waiving 
~:1c ~eneral statutes of limitation. The 
~ontractor thereupon again brought suit. The 
Court dismissed on the grounds the special 
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lc:::;is.lai:ion violated the equal protection clause 
oi t"nc lL:-th .\men<lment and provisions of 
.. ~::;'.1in:_;ton' s Constitution. The Court quoted the 
folloui.n::; \1ith approval from the case of no0ni v • 
.'crn::ti, 22l, Hass. 152, 112 N.E. 853,. L.R.A. 
191GF, G31 (1916), which was cited with approval 
in Sirrine v. State, 132 s.c. 241, 128 S.E. 172 
(1925): 
"
1 It is an essential element of equal 
protection of the laus that each person shall 
possess t:1e unhampered right to assert in the 
conrl:s h::_s ri0hts, (sic) ''1ithout 
ci:_::;crirnination, by the same rrocccses against' 
t:10sc uh.a \'lrOn:i '1im as are open to every 
otl.1c;: person. The courts must be onen to all 
nno;1 the same terms. No obstacles can be 
tLro~:n in the uay of some which a:;..·c· not 
intcr~oseci in the nath of others. Recourse 
to t:1c l2.\7 oy all alike without partiality or. 
;~vor, for the vindication of rights and the 
r~(~ess of \rrongs is essential to equality 
bc.:0: ...-2 the la,1. 1 " (Emrhasis added in the 
Alton V. Phillips decision) 
ln A~ncu v. Superior Court, 257 P.2d 661 (Cal. 
l9~3) various proceedings against the petitioner 
;,c:d been taken in juvenile court and municipal 
coui.-t in the course of which petitioner appealed 
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"ui: 1.'.'lS not pe:nnitted to perfect her appeal since 
;:-,.~ cJ..e:cl: .'.:i1d reporter had not: prepared a 
~;"ncc:dpt. The district court held, among other 
t;1:i.r(;s, that the. ~uppression of the exercise of 
t;1e :ci;:;ht to appeal amounted to a clea.:- denial of 
~~ud :H·otection of law which was prohibited by 
t'.;e 1L:.t:1 l.m.enclment. 
In t:1e case before the Court the decision of 
t~ court effectively suppresses, denies and 
c::::~ec fro;:u Plaintiff its right to a jury 
determincition of the issues under circumst.ances 
not aPi)lied to any other person or in any other 
cacc. Such clearly amounts to a denial of the 
equal protection of law guaranteed by the 14th· 
,\.r.1cndment. 
In 11orµant i v. Horgan ti, 222 P. 2d 78 (Cal. 
l9SG), the court held violative of the equal 
Jrotcction clause a certain provision of the 
' C::tlifornia Civil Code which required in a 
01vorce case for insanity that the plaintiff 
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:lL::c dnd prove financial ability to support the 
~ci:!nC:ant for life as a condition to obtaining a 
! divorce. The Court held this. denied equal 
pro;:ect:;_on of the laws because it made the right 
to a divorce for insanity dependent solely upon 
the financial condition of the parties. 
In Re Trummer, 36 Cal. Rptr. 281, 388 P.2d 
177 (Sup. Ct. Cal. 1964), is directly in point. 
In that case the petitioner was adjudged a 
narcotics addict. He contended, among other 
rhings, that although there was no initial 
constitutional right to a jury trial in a 
narcotics commitment proceeding in California, by 
affording a jury trial on the issues of addiction 
to ccrta.in categories of persons committed ior 
W&s provided for in proceedings in a municipal or 
---
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-~~1ce court under certain sections of the penal 
co(~'-- ;iut uas not provided for under other 
~;:;cl: .... ons covcri'.1;; proceedings taken for the same 
/J~·:)oscs Hi a superior court. No reasonable 
~rounds existed for the distinction in the 
vacious raodes of procedure provided. Hence, a 
vioJ.at:ion of equal protection of the laws was 
held to have taken place. Likewise, in the 
1,:sl:aT"tt ccse there is no reasonable ground, basis 
or even a claim why the jury verdict secured by 
Pbintiff should be any less respected than a 
jury verdict in any other jury case. A jury 
tri.:11 u.:is in fact provided and the uncontroverted 
p~ysical evidence was not only sufficient to 
~ictri.:,:mt upholding the verdict, it compelled the 
JL:r; t:o reach the conclusion that the Defendant's 
r: . ::ccuCi1t was negligent. The constitutional and 
:::.l:.i~uto::cy provisions aided by the common law to 
-~~ lffect that a jury verdict is final, unless 
L:-n.:i.·.:: i3 no evidence to support it were not 
i 
I 
I 
I 
i 
'' 
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.ull~:c<l by the court in arriving at its decision. 
;e:~i:;-,c.1- uc:re the mJ.ny decisions, some of which 
:::c c,;_i:cL in this brief, which state that a jury 
'.'C::r6::..ct \;ill nev:er be overturned where there is 
c:v.Ldence; to support it upon which reasonable 
QinGs could iind the matter in issue. The result 
"'-u 0ecn a clear denial to Plaintiff of equal 
:1rnL:cction of the laws of the State of Utah. 
In short, if it is a denial of equal 
[hul:cction of the laws to refuse equitable relief 
i:o one class of persons only '(Truax v. Corrigan); 
to prevent a class of corporations from· being 
~urchase:rs at legal foreclosure sales (Black v. 
Calduell); to require special rules of pleading 
of a lini.ted class of litigants in a limited 
class of cases (Board of Education v. Alliance 
:.~;:.:ui-. Co.); to waive the statute of limitations 
~s to a single favored person (Alton v. Phillips 
1:c. ~s-~.~) ; to suppress the right to appeal in 
c. oiacticular case by refusing preparation of a 
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.~~Dscri~t (AGncw v. Superior Court); to 
cuaditioc1 a divorce on the financial capability 
oi: t~12 ;il.::i.intiff (Hor9anti v. Uorganti); and to 
de1> a ju;.:y to some narcotics addicts on the 
issue of addiction depending upon the court used. 
(r~, P,e Tru:-;;:ser), then it is the clearest kind of 
a violation of the equal protection clause of the 
J.!,th Arc:ec1dnent to take away a duly rendered jury 
v.:::rdict without even having colorable jurisdiction 
to do so and in the face of clear appellate rules 
desiGncd to safeguard jury verdicts. 
nesidcs reviewing its opinion in the light of 
L[1c poii1i:s raised above, Plaintiff also 
1.es:_)ectfully requests the Court to review its 
decision concerning the propriety of Instruction 
Plaintiff submits that the instruction 
correctly covered the driving duties involved 
1Jndc':c the facts. It could not have misled the 
J'li ·,r in an:; ..... my, especially when viewed in the 
-0:il:C::t o.:3 the other instructions. The Court 
I 
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/ e'· 1~:t :i_::.:::;l:ructcd the jury that there 
I nrcccuwnt:::.on of due care on the nart ' . . 
was a 
of Defendant's. 
I ' ~"clA1t p'1ic'1 ores t · o d · d not exist in Vif:.'W ,,c._' ' , ._, , ·.. ' • um? l. n :. 
' o~ the physical facts. It gave an instruction on 
uuavoidable ac~idents; an instruction that 
Ho.inti££ was required to show ne3ligence by a 
I 
! I .1r2;)on<lcrancc of the evidence; an instruction 
Llfo:cminz the jury no exceptional caution was 
i."equircd and in Instruction 24 itself again re-
e;Jf.>hasized the rule that both negligence and 
?Io:i:i1nate cause had to be found in the evidence 
before a verdict could be returned for Plaintiff. 
ln::truction zc~, even if improper in some respects 
1:hici1 Plaintiff does not concede, could hardly 
have been prejudicial when the evidence compelled 
the jury to find as it did anyway. "Prejudicial 
error" means error in the sense that in its 
ali::ence there is a reasonable likelihood that 
U:ere would have been a different result. Gordon 
:::.:_Provo Citl, 15 Utah 2d 287, 391 P.2d 430 (1964) 
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could no!: have been a different result here. 
i 
~c~~lly plaintiff was entitled to a directed 
I 
i ,r,'' ct 
1
v, u~ • Nevertheless, should the Court believe 
I 
I 
l)Jciruction 2L~ \·1as prejudicially improper in some 
ris~cct, then at· oost Defendant is only entitled 
to a new trial and not a reversal. 
CO?'!CLUSION 
The physical evidence analyzed in its 
crrcircty not only adequately and sufficiently 
1
1., .. i~o~"~ '""' ... ._..,the jury's verdict, it compelled it. 
I 
; :he Cou;::t erred in evaluating and weighin3 the 
evidence at all. In erred in interpreting it. 
;:, :;o do:Lng it arrived at conclusions directly 
contr.:i.dicted by the undisputed physical facts. 
it lacked jurisdiction even to examine, let alone 
, re-determine the ultimate facts as found by the 
I 
I The decision of the Court denied Plaintiff 
I 
I 
1 '~U.:il protection of the laws in that the co·urt 
:~iled to apply the normal rules of appellate 
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,._·.;i·.c~1, ~) c;:;_·ticu larly those respecting a jury 
Scc~ion 27 of Article 1 of the Constitution 
•h ~:1e Stn::e of Utah directs that ''Frequent 
;.·ccui:rcnce to fundamental principles is essential 
to i:hc sccu:dty of individual rights and the 
per;:>ctuity of free government." 
Plaintiff asks only that the Court recur to 
fonda.rnen'.:al principles in the instant case; that 
ic rcrr.it a rehearing; that it recognize that its 
~resent decision is totally out of harmony with 
;i;1;ilic.ible constitutional, statutory and cas.e law 
principles; and that upon a further hearing the 
Cou;:-t a:Efinu the judgment of the lower court 
ui1jch entered judgment on the jury verdict. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Arthur H. Nielsen 
NIELSEN, CONDER, HANSEN 
AND HENRIOD 
and 
J. Harlan Burns 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Respondent 
